Multiple governments and planners are scrambling to build or scale “Plan B” routes, but everything on the table is partial and expensive rather than a true replacement for Hormuz.
Keypoint: what’s actually possible
Three categories:
- Shift some flows to existing overland pipelines that bypass Hormuz.
- Build/expand multimodal corridors (ports + rail/road + pipelines) that offload before the chokepoint.
- Use longer maritime routes (Cape of Good Hope, alternative ports) as pressure‑relief valves, not permanent substitutes.
Every option runs into either capacity limits, cost, or shifting risk to a different chokepoint (Bab el‑Mandeb, Suez, Turkish straits, etc.).
Existing bypass pipelines
A few pipelines are already designed, at least conceptually, as Hormuz hedges:
| Route / asset | Conceptual role vs Hormuz | Key limits |
| Saudi East–West (Petroline: Gulf to Red Sea) | Move Saudi crude from Gulf fields to Yanbu on Red Sea, then load to tankers, skipping Hormuz entirely. | Capacity well below total Gulf export volumes; still feeds into Red Sea/Bab el‑Mandeb chokepoint. |
| UAE Abu Dhabi–Fujairah pipeline | Moves Abu Dhabi crude to Fujairah on Gulf of Oman, outside Hormuz, allowing loading directly to blue‑water tankers. | Only covers UAE volumes routed through it; Fujairah port/terminal capacity constrains scale. |
| Iraq–Türkiye (Iraq–Turkey) pipeline | Sends northern Iraqi crude to Ceyhan on Mediterranean, entirely avoiding Gulf. | Political/security risk in Iraq and along route; currently below design throughput after years of outages. |
Several more ambitious, multi‑modal schemes are being actively discussed, most as diversification rather than full displacement of Hormuz:
- UAE–Saudi “Gulf hinterland” corridors
- Concept: Use UAE ports on the Gulf of Oman (e.g., Khorfakkan, Fujairah) to offload cargo or hydrocarbons before Hormuz, then move them inland by rail/road/pipeline to Saudi and other Gulf markets.
- Status: Some infrastructure exists (ports, roads, initial rail), and recent investments are framed explicitly as giving the region a backup to Hormuz, but capacity is modest and scaling will take years and several more billions of capital.
- Use case: Acts as a diversification tool during crises rather than a wholesale rerouting of Gulf trade.
- India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC)
- Concept: A US‑backed long‑term project creating a rail‑maritime corridor from India through UAE and Saudi Arabia to Jordan and Israel, then across the Mediterranean (e.g., to Greece), as an alternative to both China’s BRI and some traditional sea routes.
- Relevance to Hormuz: In theory, some containerized trade and possibly refined products could move across the Arabian Peninsula by rail rather than by sea through Hormuz, especially India–Europe flows.
- Constraints: Experts note IMEC is far from operational; the Hormuz crisis has strengthened the political argument for redundancy but doesn’t conjure the infrastructure into existence.
- Routes via Türkiye, Syria, Lebanon (if stabilized)
- Concept: Gulf exports (especially oil/gas) moved via pipeline/rail through Iraq and/or Jordan to Mediterranean ports in Türkiye, or if and when conditions permit, via rehabilitated networks in Syria/Lebanon.
- Drivers: Commentators highlight these as potentially “less politically sensitive” than Israeli‑linked corridors and commercially viable in the long run if security improves.
- Reality check: These are highly conceptual right now; they require not only massive capital but durable political settlements in some of the most fragile theaters in the region.
- Gulf‑to‑Gulf‑of‑Oman canal ideas
- There are recurring proposals and informal discussions (including among Gulf policy circles and analysts) about engineering a ship canal across parts of the Arabian Peninsula to bypass Hormuz altogether.
- At present, these are more speculative than actionable, facing extreme engineering, environmental, and political hurdles; analysts tend to treat them as thought experiments rather than near‑term policy.
Maritime work‑arounds and “relief valve” routes
Because physical alternatives are so constrained, the serious near‑term “Plan B” is often just longer sea voyages plus re‑routed load/offload points:
- Cape of Good Hope
- Ships can sail around southern Africa, bypassing the Gulf entirely and also sidestepping Red Sea risk.
- This already happened at scale during both the Red Sea disruptions and the current Hormuz crisis, but it adds 10–14 days to typical Asia–Europe voyages and drove container shipping rates roughly to double earlier during the Red Sea test run.
- It is operationally feasible but not economically sustainable as a “new normal” for all the trade currently transiting Hormuz.
- Red Sea–Suez via Bab el‑Mandeb
- For flows that originate or can be re‑routed via the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea/Suez route remains central, linking to Europe and parts of Africa.
- But it simply trades one choke point (Hormuz) for another (Bab el‑Mandeb), which has seen repeated Houthi attacks and is itself vulnerable to future disruption.
- Omani ports east of Hormuz
- Oman has invested in ports such as Duqm and others on the Arabian Sea/Gulf of Oman that avoid the need to pass through Hormuz for certain cargoes.
- Analysts frame these as incremental diversification, not full substitutes for the giant export/ import complexes inside the Gulf.
Conceptual vs realistic replacement
- The only true “replacement” in a volumetric sense would be a massive expansion of overland pipeline and rail from all major Gulf producers to ports on the Mediterranean, Red Sea, or Gulf of Oman, which is decades‑scale and politically fraught.
- Current pipelines plus Cape‑of‑Good‑Hope rerouting can cushion a partial or temporary Hormuz shutdown but cannot seamlessly absorb normal volumes without major price and timing shocks.
- Most serious planning is about redundancy and diversification, not about making Hormuz irrelevant; the strategic leverage of that chokepoint is diminished at the margins, not eliminated.
Jeffrey Newman, JD, MBA, is a whistleblower lawyer whose firm represents healthcare fraud whistleblowers and whistleblowers reporting violations of export controls, tariff evasion, money laundering, and other WB cases. Mr. Newman and his staff also represent many physician whistleblowers in healthcare fraud cases. Whistleblower laws in the U.S. allow individuals with information about export control violations or tariff fraud to report it under the False Claims Act. The Firm’s website is www.JeffNewmanLaw.com. Attorney Newman can be reached at Jeff@Jeffnewmanlaw.com or at 978-880-4758. For other blogs, see: http://JeffNewmanLaw.com
